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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 15-1100 
______________ 
 
FRANCIS J. GUGLIELMELLI 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY 
  
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 2-13-cv-05764) 
District Judge: Hon. Mitchell S. Goldberg 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 5, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.
 
(Filed:  October 6, 2015) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Francis J. Guglielmelli appeals the District Court’s order granting State Farm 
Insurance Company’s (“State Farm”) motion for summary judgment and denying his 
cross-motion for summary judgment.  We will affirm. 
I1 
On March 11, 2006, Achmad Jayadi applied online for a car insurance policy (“the 
policy”) with State Farm on behalf of himself and Guglielmelli, with whom he lived and 
shared a same-sex relationship.  The policy covered a 2000 Dodge Neon first owned by 
Jayadi and then transferred to Guglielmelli, and a 2004 Suzuki jointly owned by Jayadi 
and Guglielmelli and which was later substituted with a 2007 Jeep Liberty that 
Guglielmelli owned.  Jayadi requested bodily injury liability limits of 
$100,000/$300,0002 and reduced uninsured and underinsured motorist limits of 
$15,000/$30,000 on each car.3  The decision to reduce the limits for uninsured and 
underinsured motorist coverage resulted in lower premiums for Guglielmelli and Jayadi.  
Jayadi signed and returned to State Farm forms acknowledging his coverage selections, 
including his election of uninsured and underinsured motorist limits of $15,000/$30,000, 
                                                 
1 These facts are primarily taken from the parties’ joint stipulation of facts.   
2 This denotes $100,000 of coverage per person and $300,000 of coverage per 
accident. 
3 Under Pennsylvania law, insurers are required to make available uninsured and 
underinsured motorist coverage with limits up to those provided under the policy for 
bodily injury coverage, but the customer may reduce the amounts or waive this coverage.  
75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1731.   
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as well as rejecting stacking of the uninsured and underinsured coverage limits, which, 
when retained, allows customers to draw on the coverage for additional vehicles insured 
under their policy.  Guglielmelli did not sign either form.  State Farm issued the 
requested policy to Guglielmelli and Jayadi, listing Guglielmelli as the first named 
insured and Jayadi as the second named insured.     
The policy was renewed nine times, and on each occasion State Farm sent notices 
to Guglielmelli and Jayadi informing them of their policy limits, including the 
$15,000/$30,000 underinsured motorist coverage.  State Farm also sent Guglielmelli and 
Jayadi three amended declarations pages that also stated the underinsured motorist limits.   
Neither Jayadi nor Guglielmelli ever requested to increase the underinsured motorist 
limits of the policy.  
Guglielmelli separately applied for commercial vehicle insurance from State Farm 
for a 2000 GMC Safari for his laundry delivery business.  He selected bodily injury 
liability limits of $100,000/$300,000 and non-stacked uninsured and underinsured 
motorist limits of $100,000/$300,000.  State Farm issued the policy to Guglielmelli and 
Jayadi with Guglielmelli listed as the first named insured.   
While driving his Jeep Liberty, Guglielmelli was involved in an accident caused 
by the negligence of another driver, whose auto insurance policy provided bodily injury 
liability limits of $15,000/$30,000.  With State Farm’s consent, Guglielmelli settled his 
claim against the driver for the $15,000 available under her policy.  Guglielmelli then 
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filed a claim with State Farm for the underinsured motorist benefits available under his 
State Farm policies.  State Farm agreed to provide stacked coverage and paid him 
$30,000, which it claims is the maximum to which he is entitled.4  
Guglielmelli filed an action in the District Court seeking to recover additional 
underinsured motorist benefits from State Farm, arguing that he was entitled to $200,000 
in stacked coverage under the policy on the Neon and the Jeep Liberty, plus an additional 
$100,000 from the commercial policy on the GMC.  State Farm and Guglielmelli filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment.  The District Court concluded that Guglielmelli 
was bound by Jayadi’s written election of reduced underinsured motorist benefit limits, 
limiting him to a maximum of $30,000, and was not entitled to additional benefits from 
the commercial policy.5  As a result, the District Court granted State Farm’s motion and 
denied Guglielmelli’s cross-motion.  Guglielmelli appeals. 
                                                 
4 Under Pennsylvania law, stacked limits of uninsured and underinsured motorist 
coverage can only be rejected by written agreement of the first named insured on an auto 
insurance policy.  75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1738(e).  Because Jayadi was not the first 
named insured when he signed the rejection of stacked limits of underinsured motorist 
coverage, the form was ineffective and thus the rejection was void.   
5 On appeal, Guglielmelli has abandoned the argument that he is entitled to 
coverage under the commercial policy. 
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II6 
Section 1734 of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law 
states that “[a] named insured may request in writing the issuance of coverages under 
section 1731 (relating to availability, scope and amount of coverage) in amounts equal to 
or less than the limits of liability for bodily injury.”  75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1734.  
While waiving such coverage altogether requires the permission of the “first named 
insured” to be valid, id. § 1731, reduction of coverage can be requested by any named 
insured.  Leymeister v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 100 F. Supp. 2d 269, 272-73 
(M.D. Pa. 2000).  Once properly elected, this reduction of coverage applies to all the 
named insureds on the policy, even if they are added after the election form is executed.  
See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buffetta, 230 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2000) (woman who took 
over sole ownership of car and insurance policy after divorce was bound by reduction in 
coverage executed by her ex-husband before their divorce); Hartford Ins. Co. of the 
Midwest v. Green, 309 F. Supp. 2d 681, 692-94 (E.D. Pa. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 
124 F. App’x 555 (3d Cir. 2005) (not precedential) (wife subject to the lower uninsured 
                                                 
6 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have jurisdiction 
over the appeal of the order granting State Farm summary judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292.  We also have jurisdiction over the order denying Guglielmelli’s motion because 
the order was coupled with the order granting State Farm summary judgment.  See 
Gardner v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 544 F.3d 553, 557 n.1 (3d. Cir. 2008).  We 
review the District Court’s decision on summary judgment de novo.  Dee v. Borough of 
Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).  Summary judgment is appropriate where, 
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).  
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and underinsured motorist benefits her ex-husband selected before she was a driver or 
named insured on the policy); Kimball v. Cigna Ins. Co., 660 A.2d 1386, 1388-89 (Pa. 
Super. 1995) (daughter bound by mother’s prior reduction of benefits when the daughter 
and a new vehicle were added to the policy). 
It is undisputed that Jayadi was a named insured under the policy in question and 
that he signed a form reducing the policy’s underinsured motorist benefits.  Guglielmelli 
claims that this case “presents a novel issue because of the nature of the relationship 
between” Guglielmelli and Jayadi, Appellant Br. at 11, and cites cases suggesting that 
they were not members of the same household under Pennsylvania law.  The type of 
relationship between Guglielmelli and Jayadi is not relevant to the narrow issue before 
us, namely whether Guglielmelli is bound by Jayadi’s written request for reduced 
underinsured motorist coverage.  Guglielmelli offers no basis for his assertion that being 
resident relatives or members of the same household is necessary in order to be bound by 
the election of another named insured on the same car insurance policy.   
While Guglielmelli argues that the above-cited caselaw exclusively involved 
parties who were legally considered family members “at the relevant time,” Appellant’s 
Reply Br. at 3, this common fact is insufficient to prove that being a member of the same 
household or family is necessary to their holdings.  In fact, Nationwide and Hartford 
suggest that family or household status is irrelevant.  Nationwide held that an election 
made by a husband during a marriage was still binding on his ex-wife after divorce, and 
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thereby separation of the households, had occurred.  230 F.3d at 634.  In Hartford, the 
election of reduced benefits occurred before the couple was married, when the wife “was 
not a member of the household,” and was still considered binding on her after their 
divorce.  309 F. Supp. 2d at 693.  
Guglielmelli further argues that State Farm was required to solicit a new election 
of benefits when his Jeep Liberty was added to the policy and that his decision not to 
reduce the underinsured motorist benefits in the commercial insurance policy manifested 
his desire not to reduce the benefits available to him under the policy in question here.  
Appellant Br. at 16.  The onus, however, is on the named insured to request changes to 
underinsured motorist benefits, even if a new vehicle or new named insured is added to 
the policy.  See Kimball, 660 A.2d at 1388-89.  Guglielmelli was the first named insured 
and received more than a dozen notices of the underinsured motorist limits.  He and 
Jayadi continued to pay the reduced premiums resulting from their lower coverage level, 
and never requested a change in coverage.  See id. (citing fact that plaintiff was a named 
insured when notice amending policy and listing policy limits was delivered to her 
household, that lower premiums were paid without question, and that she “could have 
increased coverage under her mother’s policy . . . or secured her own separate policy . . . 
[but] took no action on either front”).  Thus, the District Court correctly concluded that 
Guglielmelli is bound by both Jayadi’s reduction of the underinsured motorist coverage 
and his own repeated decisions not to alter it. 
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III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment to State Farm and denying Guglielmelli’s cross-motion for summary 
judgment.  
